The human suffering caused by the political ideology of apartheid in South Africa during the Apartheid era prompted worldwide condemnation and a variety of diplomatic and legal responses. Amongst these responses was the attempt to have apartheid recognised both as a crime against humanity in the 1973 Apartheid Convention as well as a war crime in Article 85(4)(c) of Additional Protocol I. This article examines the origins, nature and current status of the practices of apartheid as a war crime and its possible application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Section 5.2 examines the inclusion of the "practices of apartheid" in the list of grave breaches of AP I. It details the criticism levelled against the inclusion of the "practices of apartheid" in the list of grave breaches of AP I. Section 5.3 addresses the process of inclusion of apartheid in the ICC Statute with particular emphasis on the failure to include the practices of apartheid in the list of war crimes. Section 5.4 criticises the inclusion of " [t] he practice of apartheid" in the list of customary international humanitarian law crimes by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the basis that the evidence relied upon relates almost exclusively to state practice declaring apartheid to be a crime against humanity. Section 5.5 asserts that the possible liability of individual Israeli citizens for carrying out policies that fall within the agreed definition of apartheid will depend on the customary status of the various international attempts to criminalise apartheid. The importance of distinguishing between the civil obligations of states and the potential criminal liability of individuals is also stressed. Section 5.6 assesses the customary status of the crime of apartheid as both a crime against humanity and as a war crime paying special attention to the principle of legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege). Section 5.7 concludes by stating that, even if the customary status of the crime of apartheid remains in doubt, the customary status of persecution on racial grounds and the other inhumane acts required to enforce any policy of systematic racial discrimination (whether characterised as apartheid or not) does not.
The Inclusion of the "Practices of Apartheid" in the List of Grave Breaches of AP I

Introduction
The debate over the inclusion of the "practices of apartheid" in the list of grave breaches of AP I is indicative of the longstanding tensions between the diplomatic and legal agendas of First World countries and Third World and Eastern Bloc states. These tensions compromised some aspects of the drafting of AP I and the inclusion of the "practices of apartheid" in the list of grave breaches has been singled out for criticism in this regard. Equally problematic is that the clash between the deep-rooted ideological convictions of the negotiating parties has resulted in what Professor Yoram Dinstein has referred to as a "'Great Schism' separating the Contracting Parties of Additional Protocol I from some key players in the international arena led by the US". 7 This section examines the process by which the "practices of apartheid" were included in the list of grave breaches in AP I and the criticism levelled against this inclusion of the "practices of apartheid".
The pressure to include the "practices of apartheid" in the list of grave breaches
The initial ICRC draft (Article 74) merely extended the application of the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to the repression of breaches to the persons and objects falling within the protection of AP I. As early as the First Session of the Diplomatic Conference in March 1974, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam proposed a number of draft amendments to the ICRC's draft AP I including a proposal to add " [t] he continued existence of colonial regimes, the practice of apartheid and all forms of racial discrimination" to the list of international crimes defined in international law since the Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal. 8 On 23 April 1976, during the debate on the discussion of the repression of breaches of the proposed AP I, the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic made reference to the Apartheid Convention as an example of a crime against humanity that had been developed since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 9 The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 10 and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 11 made similar observations. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic also deplored the failure to include apartheid among the list of grave breaches in draft AP I. 12 On 29 April 1976, after the conclusion of the debate on the relevant article, Mongolia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania introduced an amendment to the draft list of grave breaches that had been submitted by Australia to include:
Outrages upon personal dignity especially inhuman acts such as the practices of apartheid and other humiliating and degrading treatment. 13 The amendment's sponsors stated that they were particularly concerned (i) with the need to reaffirm and develop international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts, (ii) with the need to take into account developments in the years since 1949, and (iii) with the need to prevent human suffering.
14 "The sponsors' aim was to make it clear that the practices of apartheid were serious war crimes as well as dangerous crimes against humanity". 
Criticism of the inclusion of the "practices of apartheid" in the list of grave
breaches during the drafting process The list of grave breaches (that ultimately became Article 85 of AP I) was adopted by consensus but several delegations questioned the feasibility of some of the provisions due to the vagueness of the drafting. The inclusion of the "practices of apartheid" was singled out for criticism in this regard. Both the Austrian 16 and the Finnish 17 representatives doubted whether the "practices of apartheid" could be easily transposed into national criminal laws. The Australian representative complained that some of the proposed grave breaches "did not embody the degree of specificity essential if abuse and injustice 8 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974 -1977 Ibid, p 316, para 64. were to be avoided". 18 He confirmed his delegation's condemnation of apartheid but stated: the introduction of political ideologies, hateful as they might be, into the system of grave breaches was not to reaffirm and develop humanitarian law but to distort it.
He also stated that his delegation would not have been able to support the inclusion of the "practices of apartheid" into the list of grave breaches if a separate vote had been taken. 19 The French representative also expressed his delegation's doubts about the wisdom of including the "practices of apartheid" in the list of grave breaches and stated that, although not opposed to consensus as a whole, if a vote had been taken on this point, France would have abstained.
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By contrast, the representative of Yugoslavia strongly supported regarding discriminatory practices against protected persons, such as apartheid, as grave breaches. 21 The Polish representative also expressed satisfaction at the inclusion of apartheid and inhuman and degrading practices based on racial discrimination in the list of grave breaches. 22 The Argentinean representative considered the list of grave breaches less than perfect but stated that, given the diversity of legal concepts and political opinions, it appeared to be acceptable. 
Article 85(4)(c) of AP I -commentary and criticism
Article 85(4)(c) of AP I states that the "[p]ractices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination" are grave breaches of AP I when committed wilfully and in violation of AP I. The commentary notes that sub-paragraph (4) is concerned with "off the battlefield" grave breaches and that, outside the scope of application of AP I, the crime of apartheid remains exclusively within the domain of crimes against humanity.
24
In 1976, while the negotiations were still ongoing, Professor Gerald Draper 25 criticised the creation of a war crime aimed at one State and entirely racial in content, noting that Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 26 already required respect for protected persons "without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion". In Draper's view, the deletion of the words "practices of apartheid and other" would not have altered the substantive nature of the grave breach that ultimately became Article 85(4)(c) of AP I. During the drafting process, the Ugandan representative pointed out "that all United Nations bodies, and the Security Council in particular, had always drawn a clear-cut distinction between racial discrimination and apartheid". 27 Draper also noted that " however morally defective, are not acts in any way linked with armed conflict. Placing them in the Protocol will not make them so". 28 This point had been partially conceded by the Ugandan representative during the drafting process who stated that apartheid, although not arising in a situation of armed conflict, had brought about a combat situation and that recognising apartheid as a grave breach would serve as a preventative measure likely to decrease the risk of war. 29 Draper's counter-argument was that such reasoning constituted an example of "that confusion between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, now based on racial considerations which nearly wrecked the Conference at its first session in 1974". 
Conclusion
There are currently 174 parties to AP I but the drafting of Article 85 remains controversial and although the Netherlands has stated that it regards the offences contained in Article 85 as equivalent to the war crimes specified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 31 this assertion of the customary status of the grave breaches regime in AP I is the exception rather than the rule. 32 The fact that the crime of apartheid was not included in the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)) despite a request for it to be included from the ICRC 33 is indicative of the controversy over the customary status of this war crime.
The ICC Statute and the Crime of Apartheid
Introduction
The crime of apartheid was not included in the list of crimes against humanity in the Draft Statute of the ICC produced by the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court although the core concept undoubtedly falls within the concept of persecution on 'political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural or religious' grounds that was included in subparagraph (h) of proposed article Y (defining crimes against humanity).
34 During the preliminary discussions, some delegations expressed a preference for including apartheid and other forms of racial discrimination as defined in the relevant conventions. Apartheid was, however, initially included in the possible options for the proposed definition of war crimes as an example of an outrage upon personal dignity. 36 The records of the preliminary discussions reveal a clear disagreement on the customary status of AP I. 37 While a clear majority of states considered AP I to be part of customary international law in the light of the number of ratifications of AP I, other key states (including some who have subsequently become parties to AP I) did not accept this assertion at the time that the ICC Statute was being drafted. 
The inclusion of the crime of apartheid as a crime against humanity
The absence of apartheid from the list of crimes against humanity was noted during the discussion of the draft Article 5-Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court-in the context of the debate about whether crimes against humanity could be committed in times of peace as well as war. The Mexican representative indicated that apartheid should have been included in the list of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 39 and the Irish representative noted that apartheid was the subject of a convention that did not require a link with times of armed conflict. 40 The Chairman, summing up the discussion, observed that it had been suggested that the crime of apartheid should be added to the list of crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of the Court.
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Support for the inclusion of apartheid into the list of crimes against humanity was also forthcoming from Bangladesh and Niger. 42 Once the question of the inclusion of apartheid in the list of crimes against humanity had been raised, the South African delegation intervened to lead a coalition of primarily sub-Saharan African countries 43 in ensuring its inclusion into the final draft. Notwithstanding South Africa's unassailable moral authority due to its own painful national experience, the process of negotiating a consensus definition of the crime of apartheid was relatively protracted.
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The sub-group of delegates that worked on the consensus language did not consider themselves bound by the definition in the Apartheid Convention. At one level, the existence of the overarching threshold elements for a crime against humanity contained in the chapeau rendered much of the Apartheid Convention's definition of the actus reus of the crime redundant. At another level, some states 36 McCormack 2004, pp 198-199. (particularly the United States) were anxious that the racist opinions and policies of private individuals or non-state bodies should not fall within the scope of the crime of apartheid due to concerns about freedom of expression. In deference to this, the crime of apartheid as defined in article 7(2)(h) of the ICC Statute requires the inhumane acts to be "committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime". As Professor Robert Cryer notes, "it is difficult to envisage any crime covered under this definition that would not be caught under the customary definition of 'persecution-type' crimes against humanity or 'other inhumane acts' in Article 7(1)(k)". 45
Apartheid as a war crime and the ICC Statute
During the discussions on the provisions concerning war crimes in the draft ICC Statute, 21 states expressed support for the draft version (option 2 under (p)) that included a reference to the practices of apartheid. 46 Nine states expressly rejected the reference to "practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages on personal dignity based on racial discrimination" in the list of war crimes 47 . Costa Rica's representative expressed a preference for "the broader formulation under option 1" (excluding the reference to the "practices of apartheid" in option 2) but, confusingly, also indicated that the specific elements of option 2 should possibly be considered separately. 48 The proposal to include apartheid within the list of war crimes made by a group of six African states 49 was not proceeded with and, consequently, there is no reference to the policies of apartheid in the list of war crimes in Article 8 of the ICC Statute.
In the absence of full travaux préparatoires for the ICC Statute (particularly the absence of the records of the separate working groups that drafted the definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity), the reasons for failure to include apartheid within the list of war crimes in the ICC Statute will remain a matter of conjecture. Anecdotal evidence suggests two reasons for the absence. First, the hostility by some states to anything that might strengthen the argument that AP I constituted customary law should not be underestimated. Second, the inclusion of apartheid as a crime against humanity ensured that the agenda of those states that had always supported the criminalisation of apartheid was appropriately acknowledged.
Commentators who draw attention to the discrepancies between the war crimes listed in AP I and the war crimes contained in Article 8 of the ICC Statute tend to focus on the failure to include the wilful and unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees as the key omission in the ICC Statute. 50 Sandoz submits that the inclusion of the crime of apartheid as a crime against humanity in the ICC Statute changes the language, but not the content, of the equivalent violation of AP I. 51 Sandoz further submits that the "[p]ractices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination" (Article 85(4)(c) of AP I) are probably covered by the general terminology used in Article 8(2), Part B (xxi) "Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment". 
Conclusion
The inclusion of apartheid as a crime against humanity in Article 7(1)(j) of the ICC Statute is significant for two reasons. First, it represents the first time that apartheid has been criminalised in a manner that is consistent with penal legality and certainty. 53 Second, while Article 7(1)(j) almost certainly represents progressive development, "it could be argued that the ICC Statute has, however, contributed to recent formation of a customary rule on the matter".
54 By contrast, the failure to proceed with the proposal to include apartheid in the list of war crimes in the ICC Statute could be seen as weakening the argument that the practices of apartheid constitute a customary international war crime unless Article 10 of the ICC Statute can be invoked. 55 Article 10 of the ICC Statute states:
Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.
As Schabas observes, Article 10 has been "largely ignored by the very bodies to which it is directed, namely specialised tribunals engaged in the interpretation of international law". 56 The current customary status of the crime of apartheid both as a war crime and as a crime against humanity is considered below in Sect. 5.6. 50 See, e.g., Graditzky 1999, p 204; Dörmann 2003, p 345; Sandoz 2008, p 310 . 51 
The ICRC's Customary International Humanitarian Law Project
In 1996, the ICRC embarked on a major international study into current practice in international humanitarian law in order to identify the relevant customary law in the area. The ICRC's Study on International Customary Law (the ICRC Study), published in three volumes in 2005, has been welcomed as a valuable contribution to the development of customary international humanitarian law but concerns have been expressed about its methodology. 57 It is beyond the scope of this article to do justice to the vigorous debate over the methodological concerns beyond assessing the validity of the assertion that "[t]he practice of apartheid or other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages on personal dignity based on racial discrimination" constitutes a war crime under customary international humanitarian law.
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The ICRC Study cites as authority the fact that "[t]his war crime is listed as a grave breach in Additional Protocol I". 59 The ICRC Study acknowledges the omission of the crime of apartheid from the list of war crimes in the ICC Statute but argues "such conduct would amount to a war crime as an outrage on personal dignity, as well as humiliating and degrading treatment". 60 The ICRC Study also states, in the application of international humanitarian law, apartheid is a crime under the legislation of numerous States. With a few notable exceptions, 61 all the examples of national legislation cited involve the incorporation of either AP I or the ICC Statute into domestic law and the rather limited exceptions are all parties to the Apartheid Convention who were formerly members of the Eastern (Soviet) Bloc.
The ICRC Study notes that no practice was found in national case law 62 or international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies 63 to support the existence of the customary war crime of the "practices of apartheid". The remaining practice cited relates to debates before the UN General Assembly (UNGA), various UNGA resolutions, UN Security Council resolutions and two resolutions adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1992 and 1993 declaring apartheid to be a crime against humanity. 64 The ICRC Study also notes that section 5(i)(j) of UN Transitional Administration in East Timor Regulation No. 2000/15 includes "the crime of apartheid" in the list of crimes against humanity over which the panels established by the Regulation have exclusive universal jurisdiction. 65 Although, there is a case for arguing that apartheid as defined in Article 7(1)(j) of the ICC Statute is evolving into a customary crime against humanity, it is more difficult to argue that the practices of apartheid constitute a customary international war crime given failure to include a reference to the crime of apartheid within the list of war crimes contained in the ICC Statute and the controversy over the drafting of 57 62 Ibid, p 2058, para 636. 63 Ibid, p 2060, para 650. 64 Ibid, pp 2058 Ibid, pp -2060 . 65 See United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, UNTAET Reg. 2000 /15 (6 June 2000 , on the establishment of panels with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offences. the grave breaches regime in AP I. Given the clear distinction between the categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity, 66 it is disappointing that the ICRC Study's evidence for the existence of a war crime of the practices of apartheid under customary international humanitarian law is primarily related to state practice declaring apartheid to be a crime against humanity.
Israel and the Crime of Apartheid
Introduction
The term apartheid is used loosely in a number of non-legal contexts to emphasise the seriousness of various inequalities. Increasingly, the paradigm of apartheid has also been applied in relation to Israel. 67 Since 2005 an annual "Israeli Apartheid Week" has been held on university campuses (and in other civic spaces) to raise awareness about Israel's policies, although these events have occasionally drawn accusations of anti-Semitism. The application of the apartheid paradigm in relation to Israel's policies and practices towards Palestinians in the Occupied Territories has recently crossed the divide between rhetorical device and legal analysis.
Israel and the apartheid paradigm -the legal dimensions
In 2007 Professor John Dugard, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, concluded that elements of the Israeli occupation constituted forms of colonialism and apartheid, which are contrary to international law. 68 Dugard also noted:
the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid appears to be violated by many practices, particularly those denying freedom of movement to Palestinians.
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In 2010 Professor Richard Falk, Dugard's successor as UN Special Rapporteur, likewise concluded that Israeli policies in the West Bank and East Jerusalem exhibited "features of colonialism and apartheid, as well as transforming a de jure condition of occupation into a circumstance of de facto annexation". 70 Falk, with reference to Article 7 of the ICC Statute, also noted that "apartheid has come to be formally treated as a crime against humanity" 71 To support the factual basis for his assertions, Falk made reference to a 300-page report from the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa released in May 2009 (written by an international team of scholars and practitioners of international law) concluding that Israel is practising both colonialism and apartheid in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). 72 In his final presentation to the Human Rights Council in January 66 The need for a nexus between an armed conflict and the criminal act in question for a war crime and the contextual threshold for crimes against humanity, i.e. the commission of a listed prohibited act in the context of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 67 
The importance of distinguishing between civil and criminal obligations
When discussing the concept of apartheid in relation to Israel's policies towards the Palestinians, it is important to distinguish between a general (civil) obligation owed by the State of Israel not to engage in systematic racial discrimination and potential criminal liability for individual Israeli citizens as a result of enforcing any Israeli policies towards the Palestinians that can fairly be characterised as apartheid. With regard to the former, Israel-not least because it is a party to ICERD 76 -is obliged to "condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under [its] jurisdiction". 77 In May 2012, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) urged Israel to prohibit and eradicate all policies of racial segregation and apartheid which severely and disproportionally affected the Palestinian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and which violated the provisions of Article 3 of ICERD. 
Conclusion
Israel is not a party to either the Apartheid Convention, AP I or the ICC Statute and consequently is not under an obligation to incorporate the conventional crimes of apartheid into its domestic law. Criminal liability for individual Israeli citizens for carrying out the policies condemned by the CERD in 2012-in the absence of a successful To the extent that apartheid constitutes either a customary international crime against humanity and/or a war crime under customary international humanitarian law, it does not appear that Israel can be regarded as a persistent objector to the international criminalisation of apartheid particularly as a crime against humanity. Israel voted in favour of the adoption of the draft 1968 Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (the 1968 Convention) that refers to apartheid as a crime against humanity 81 and Judge Eli Nathan, Head of the Israeli delegation at the drafting of the ICC Statute, in his statement explaining Israel's negative vote in relation to the adoption of the ICC Statute, made it clear that but for the inclusion of Article 8(2)(b)(viii)-the transfer of the population of an occupying power into the territory it occupies or deporting the existing population from the occupied territory-his delegation "would have been proudly able to vote in favour of adopting the Statute".
82 Although Nathan also indicated that Israel had other problems with the ICC Statute which they would address at the appropriate time, given Israel's positive vote for the adoption of the 1968 Convention, it seems inconceivable that this would include the crime of apartheid. 33-34. 83 Israel signed the ICC Statute on 31 December 2000 stating that it was an active supporter of the concept of an International Criminal Court, and its realisation in the form of the ICC Statute but it rejected any attempt to interpret its provisions "in a politically motivated manner against Israel and its citizens". 84 See, e.g., McCormack and Simpson 1994, p 42. southern Africa, 85 tend to rely on statements made by the representatives of Australia, Cyprus and the United States during the drafting process. 86 The original draft convention did not contain the phrase "as practised in southern Africa". 87 During the discussion of the draft convention on 22 October 1973, the United States' representative complained:
The customary status of the 1973 Apartheid Convention
Article I would be open to very broad interpretations going beyond both the intentions of its drafters and the geographical limits of southern Africa. The Convention could be applied to situations which currently were entirely unforeseeable.
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At the same meeting, the Cypriot representative too expressed concerns about the drafting of the convention "mainly from the legal point of view" and noted that "it must be remembered that it would become part of the body of international law and might last beyond the time when apartheid was being practised in South Africa". 89 The following day, the Australian representative also expressed concerns that "the concept of apartheid was being widened to such an extent that it could be applicable to areas other than South Africa".
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In response to these criticisms, the Moroccan representative agreed that Article II should be made clearer and she proposed that the phrase "as practised in southern Africa" should be added to draft Article II. 91 The Algerian representative supported the Moroccan proposal and stated that "[w]ith regard to the amendment to Article II proposed orally by the representative of Morocco, it would be highly desirable to specify the geographical area". 92 The Tunisian representative also spoke in favour of the Moroccan proposal clarifying and precisely defining the sphere of application of the Convention and she expressed the hope that the amendment would help to dispel certain misgivings expressed by some delegations. 93 The proposed Moroccan amendment was adopted by 89 votes to three with 19 abstentions. 94 It should also be noted that during the drafting of the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission (ILC) also expressed the view that the Apartheid Convention was limited in its geographical scope to southern Africa.
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The second problem with asserting the customary status of a crime of apartheid based on the Apartheid Convention is the lack of a universal opinio iuris.
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Not only was the Apartheid Convention rejected by the vast majority of Western states, an overwhelming majority of the states that actually ratified the Apartheid Convention conspicuously failed to incorporate the crime into their domestic law prior to the drafting of the ICC Statute.
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Even if the Apartheid Convention could be regarded as the basis of a general customary crime of apartheid, the ambit of this crime could not be wider than the conventional crime on which it was based and thus any such customary international crime against humanity would be restricted to the geographical limits of southern Africa and would consequently be inapplicable to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Further, given the express limitations on the geographical scope of the Apartheid Convention, it also cannot apply qua treaty to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict notwithstanding the fact that the United Nations Treaty Database records the accession of the State of Palestine to the Apartheid Convention on 2 April 2014.
The customary status of Article 85(4)(c) of AP I
There are two key factors in the assertion of the existence of a customary war crime of apartheid with potential application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First, unlike the Apartheid Convention, there are no express geographical limits to the operation of Article 85(4)(c) of AP I and, second, the extensive ratification of AP I (174 states are currently party to AP I) raises at least a rebuttable presumption with regard to the customary status of its main provisions.
With regard to the first factor, whilst there are no express geographical limits vis-à-vis Article 85(4)(c) of AP I, an examination of the travaux préparatoires of AP I reveals that the racist regimes in southern Africa were the sole targets. In the context of treaty interpretation, the principle of contemporaneity provides:
The terms of a treaty must be interpreted according to the meaning which they possessed, or which would have been attributed to them, and in the light of the current linguistic usage, at the time when the treaty was originally concluded. 98 If, at the time that AP I was originally concluded, the current linguistic usage of the term apartheid was limited to South Africa, then Article 85(4)(c) of AP I could only be applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by analogy. However, as early as 1961, the "architect of apartheid", South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, criticised what he saw as Israeli hypocrisy in voting in favour of a UNGA resolution deploring South Africa's policies based on racial discrimination as reprehensible and 95 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, reprinted in [1991] Yearbook of the ILC, Vol II(2), 79-107, p 103, para 4. 96 Cassese 2008, p 13; Hannum 1997, p 144; Tomuschat 1995, p 54 . 97 See Amnesty International 2011 and note the frequent statements that "apartheid is not defined/included in the Penal Code [of state X]..., so prosecutions would have to be for ordinary crimes" in relation to states that are parties to the Apartheid Convention. See also Carrillo and Nelson 2013, p 13 (noting that 10 out of 34 States (29%) surveyed in 2013 excluded apartheid from the list of prohibited acts in their CAH (crimes against humanity) legislation and that "seven of these 10 States have ratified or acceded to the Convention on Apartheid".). 98 Fitzmaurice 1957 , p 212. See also Kotzur 2012 repugnant to human dignity 99 on the grounds that Israel, like South Africa, was an apartheid state.
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In the early 1970s, some Palestinian authors also compared Israeli proposals for limited Palestinian autonomy with the Bantustan strategy in South Africa. 101 In an infamous 1975 UNGA resolution (revoked in 1991) declaring Zionism to be a form of racism and racial discrimination, the UNGA took note of an Organisation of African Unity resolution which considered that the racist regimes in occupied Palestine and in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa had a common imperialist origin and the same racist structure.
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In its 1975 resolution on the inter-temporal problem, L'Institut de Droit International noted:
Lorsqu'une disposition conventionnelle se réfère à une notion juridique ou autre sans la définir, il convient de recourir aux méthodes habituelles d'interprétation pour déterminer si cette notion doit être comprise dans son acception au moment de l'établissement de la disposition ou dans son acception au moment de l'application.
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Thus, even if the current linguistic usage of the term "apartheid" was limited to southern Africa in 1977, a dynamic (evolutive) interpretation might still be appropriate, and the principle of contemporaneity is increasingly honoured only in the breach. 104 Although it is an accepted principle that criminal law provisions must not be extensively construed to the accused's detriment, in S.W. v. United Kingdom, 105 the European Court of Human Rights held that an evolutive interpretation of a common law principle (that a husband could not be found guilty of rape upon his wife) was not incompatible with the principle of legality contained in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 106 With regard to the second factor (the customary status of the grave breaches regime in AP I due to the number of ratifications), the inclusion of the "practices of apartheid" in the list of grave breaches of AP I was controversial 107 and the ambivalence towards the grave breaches regime in AP I was evident during the drafting of the ICC Statute. The New Zealand representative, for example, argued:
the definition of war crimes must not fall short of existing, widely accepted standards of international humanitarian law as reflected in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, which, given the large number of State parties thereto, constituted customary international law.
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Views hostile to the customary status of the definitions of war crimes in AP I were also expressed (particularly from Israel) 109 and the absence of the practices of apartheid from the list of war crimes in the ICC Statute suggests continuing unease over the drafting of Article 85(4)(c) of AP I (notably the problem of category error; i.e., there is no necessary link between the practices of apartheid and armed conflicts). 
The customary status of the crime of apartheid as a crime against humanity in the ICC Statute
Darryl Robinson has argued that the delegations participating in the Rome Conference were keen to limit the definitions of crimes against humanity to existing customary law and that, with regard to enforced disappearances and the crime of apartheid, both could be regarded as examples of other inhuman acts that now deserved express recognition due to the special concern of the international community.
111 However, in the case of enforced disappearances, the ICC's Elements of Crimes makes it clear that it is to be regarded as a progressive development. 112 No such restriction is included in the elements of the crime against humanity of apartheid but, as Professor Kai Ambos acknowledges, the customary law character of the crime is controversial. 113 With regard to the customary status of apartheid as a crime against humanity, two possible dates should be considered. First, if the definition of the crime in Article 7(1)(j) of the ICC Statute can be regarded as crystallisation of earlier state practice, then the date of adoption of the ICC Statute (17 July 1998) would be the critical date. However, and second, if the ICC Statute is to be regarded as a new beginning for the worldwide application of the crime of apartheid (progressive development), then only subsequent state practice will suffice. It might be possible to regard the date of the coming into force of the ICC Statute (1 July 2002) as the critical date, but various studies of the ambit of universal criminal jurisdiction made after the adoption and coming into force of the ICC Statute have failed to include the crime of apartheid in their list of customary crimes against humanity although the uncertainty surrounding the status of the crime of apartheid was noted.
The 2001 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction observed that "Apartheid, terrorism, and drug crimes were raised as candidates for inclusion" 114 and the 2002 preamble to the Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences: An African Perspective similarly expresses concern at the fact that "certain offences which have particular resonance in Africa, such as the crime of apartheid, have so far not attracted prosecution under the principle of universal jurisdiction". 115 The 2005 Institut de Droit International report on universal criminal jurisdiction also failed to include apartheid in the list of crimes to which universal jurisdiction applied. 116 I have argued elsewhere that the use of the "copy out" technique (i.e., the incorporation of the ICC Statute's definition of crimes against humanity into domestic law) by states not party to the ICC Statute will end this uncertainty once and for all. 
The crime of apartheid and the problem of legality
Prior to the drafting of the ICC Statute, all the international instruments criminalising apartheid were created with a specific target in mind and, thus, it can be argued that the crimes that they contain could only be applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by analogy. The prohibition against analogy is a generally accepted component of the nullum crimen principle, 118 and this may make the application of international instruments criminalising apartheid drafted before the end of the Apartheid era difficult to apply to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in spite of the absence of any express geographical limitations in Article 85(4)(c) of AP I (unless the principle of dynamic (evolutive) interpretation can be applied to this grave breach). 119 The interdiction of analogy as part of the principle of legality is particularly important here because the fact that Israel is a party to ICERD has surprising ramifications for the applicability of a customary law crime of apartheid to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. In various German Border Guards cases, both the European Court of Human Rights 120 and the UN Human Rights Committee 121 have held that where an individual's conduct (albeit in furtherance of an official policy) breaches a binding obligation under international human rights law, a subsequent criminal conviction will not breach the principle of legality; i.e., the rules of international law on the protection of human rights ensured that the offences were sufficiently accessible and foreseeable.
Although, as noted above, few states provided for jurisdiction over the crime of apartheid prior to their ratification of AP I and the ICC Statute, the principle of non-retroactivity or nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia is not breached by the failure to incorporate an international crime into domestic law as the Eichmann case demonstrates.
122 Although Eichmann was convicted of both war crimes and crimes against humanity, recent state practice suggests that retrospective legislation is more easily applied to war crimes than crimes against humanity. 
Conclusion
If doubt remains over the customary status of the crime of apartheid as a crime against humanity, a much stronger case can be made for the customary status of the "practices of apartheid" as a war crime. Although Article 85(4)(c) of AP I was both a progressive development and specifically targeted at South Africa, a provision representing progressive development in one multilateral treaty may be regarded as a codification if repeated in a later multilateral treaty. Had apartheid been included in the list of war crimes in Article 8 of the ICC Statute, this would certainly have entailed the codification of the "practices of apartheid" as a war crime. However, its absence from the list of war crimes in the ICC Statute weakens but does not necessarily destroy the argument for the customary status of Article 85(4)(c) of AP I for several reasons. First, Article 7(1)(j) ICC Statute confirms the status of apartheid as an international crime albeit as a crime against humanity. Second, the fact that the ICC Statute recognises that crimes against humanity can be committed outside the context of an armed conflict entails that the war crime of the "practices of apartheid" is, in effect, a lesser-included offence rendering its inclusion in the ICC Statute as a war crime redundant.
124 Third, the inclusion of the crime of apartheid in the ICC Statute can be regarded as acceptance that the concept of apartheid has a worldwide application. Finally, Article 10 of the ICC Statute expressly stipulates that the failure to include a crime cannot be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing existing or developing rules of international law "for purposes other than this Statute".
In her reply to Dugard and Reynolds' recent article in the European Journal of International Law, Professor Yaffa Zilbershats accepted the premise that apartheid as practised in the former South Africa "remains today a crime against the law of nations applicable to states practising a similar regime", 125 but asserted that the fundamental error underlying the authors' analysis is that apartheid "both in wider usage and specifically in the South African experience, is characterized by the institutionalized racism of a government against citizens and residents under its sovereign regime".
126
While this might potentially be true of the underlying conceptualisation of crimes against humanity generally, it is certainly not true of the underlying conceptualisation of war crimes, and Article 85 (4) 
Conclusion
Although all the international instruments criminalising apartheid prior to the drafting of the ICC Statute were produced as part of the international campaign against South Africa, universally applicable norms of international law can emerge in response to a specific historical experience. The prohibition of genocide is an obvious case-in-point. However, in the relation to the prohibition of genocide, the international crime that resulted was not limited by reference to the specific historical experience that prompted its creation. By contrast, the criminalisation of apartheid prior to the drafting of the ICC Statute needed to be expressly linked to the specific political ideology that motivated its creation in order to avoid any claims of exceptionalism that might have been made in response to a less explicit criminalisation.
If the factual basis exists, the application of the apartheid paradigm to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can serve an important rhetorical function but-in the absence of a successful Palestinian ratification of the ICC Statute 130 -the question of individual criminal responsibility will be beset by the problem of the principle of legality, specifically the prohibition of analogy, until the question of the customary status of the crime of apartheid is settled. The recent ratification of AP I by the Palestinian Authority 131 may not alter the applicability of the war crime of the "practices of apartheid" to the Israel-Palestine conflict unless an evolutive interpretation can be applied to Article 85(4)(c) of AP I. However, even if the customary status of the crime of apartheid (as well as the applicability of Article 85(4)(c) of AP I qua treaty) remains in doubt, there can be no doubt that the acts required to enforce any policy of systematic racial discrimination would fall squarely within the definition of clearly established customary law crimes against humanity such as persecution and other inhumane acts. Where applicable, such policies would also breach the obligation contained in Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention to treat protected persons "without any adverse distinction based, in particular on race, religion or political opinion" and the war crime codified in Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the ICC Statute-"[t]he transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory"-may be relevant too.
